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Essays
Uncooperative Environmental Federalism 2.0
JONATHAN H. ADLER†

As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump promised to curtail federal environmental regulation
and empower the states. Has the Trump Administration made good on these pledges to
reinvigorate cooperative federalism and constrain environmental regulatory overreach by the
federal government? Perhaps less than one would think. This Essay provides a critical assessment
of the Trump Administration’s approach to environmental federalism. Despite the
Administration’s embrace of “cooperative federalism” rhetoric, environmental policy reforms
have not consistently embodied a principled approach to environmental federalism in which the
state and federal governments are each encouraged to focus resources on areas of comparative
advantage.

†
Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and inaugural Director of the
Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This
Essay is based upon remarks delivered at the Symposium “Revolution or Evolution? Administrative Law in the
Age of Trump,” at University of California, Hastings College of the Law, February 21, 2020.
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INTRODUCTION
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump promised to curtail federal
environmental regulation. On the campaign trail he inveighed against what he
characterized as intrusive and unduly expansive federal rules inhibiting the use
of fossil fuels.1 He further promised to “eliminate the unconstitutional Waters of
the U.S. rule” and constrain federal regulation of private land use.2 The federal
government “waste[s] all . . . this money” on environmental protection,
candidate Trump explained, “[w]e’re going to bring that back to the states.”3
As President, Trump moved quickly to advance his agenda of
environmental deregulation.4 To helm the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Trump selected one of the agency’s most ardent and aggressive critics,
Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt.5 As a state attorney general, Pruitt filed
numerous lawsuits against federal environmental regulations, particularly those
promulgated by the EPA.6 In Pruitt’s view, such regulations burdened economic
growth and development and unduly interfered with the rightful prerogatives of
state governments.
Some state policymakers were guardedly optimistic that the Trump
Administration would reinvigorate cooperative federalism. In June 2017, the
Environmental Council of the States released a blueprint for “Cooperative
Federalism 2.0,” that sought to outline how state agencies could work with
federal officials to achieve environmental goals.7 Among other things, this
1. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Brady Dennis, Trump Victory Reverses U.S. Energy and Environmental
Priorities, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016, 8:34 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environ
ment/wp/2016/11/09/trump-victory-reverses-u-s-energy-and-environmental-priorities/.
2. See Clinton, Trump Split Over WOTUS, CAPITAL PRESS (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.capitalpress.
com/clinton-trump-split-over-wotus/article_6e64d61d-b8c6-575b-ba95-33502c9a0dcb.html;
Presidential
Candidates Answer Farmers’ and Ranchers’ Questions, FBNEWS (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.fb.org/news/
presidential-candidates-answer-farmers-and-ranchers-questions.
3. Ben Adler, Trump’s Budget Plan Is Completely Insane—and of Course It Would Screw over the
Environment, GRIST (Feb. 27, 2016), https://grist.org/politics/trumps-budget-plan-is-completely-insane-and-ofcourse-it-would-screw-over-the-environment/.
4. See Daniel A. Farber, Trump, EPA, and the Anti-Regulatory State, REG. REV. (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/01/24/farber-trump-epa-anti-regulatory-state/; Cary Coglianese, Let’s Be
Real About Trump’s First Year in Regulation, REG. REV. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/
01/29/lets-be-real-trumps-first-year-regulation/. These various deregulatory initiatives have not all fared
particularly well in federal court. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hostile Environment, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 27, 2018,
10:33 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostile-environment/ (detailing some of the
early legal troubles of the Trump Administration’s environmental deregulatory efforts).
5. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Trump Picks Scott Pruitt, Climate Change Denialist, to
Lead E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epatrump.html.
6. See Brady Dennis, Scott Pruitt, Longtime Adversary of EPA, Confirmed to Lead the Agency, WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/17/
scott-pruitt-long-time-adversary-of-epa-confirmed-to-lead-the-agency/ (“Pruitt sued the EPA more than a dozen
times during the Obama administration . . . .”); Dominique Mosbergen, Scott Pruitt Has Sued the Environmental
Protection Agency 13 Times. Now He Wants to Lead It., HUFF. POST (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.
huffpost.com/entry/scott-pruitt-environmental-protectionagency_n_5878ad15e4b0b3c7a7b0c29c.
7. ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 2.0: ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A
CLEAN ENVIRONMENT AND PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (2017), https://www.ecos.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/ECOS-Cooperative-Federalism-2.0-June-17-FINAL.pdf.
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document called upon the federal government to reconsider and realign aspects
of the state-federal relationship.8 Some were optimistic that having a former state
official lead EPA would help initiate such reforms.
Testifying before Congress at his confirmation hearing, Pruitt explained
the importance of state participation and leadership in environmental protection:
[C]ooperative federalism must be respected and applied by the EPA with
regard to our environmental laws. Congress has wisely and appropriately
directed the EPA through our environmental statutes to utilize the expertise
and resources of the States to better protect the environment, and for the States
to remain our nation’s frontline environmental implementers and enforcers. If
we truly want to advance and achieve cleaner air and water the States must be
partners and not mere passive instruments of federal will.9

Once ensconced as head of the agency, Pruitt continued to call for
curtailment of the agency’s authority and greater respect for the prerogatives of
state governments.10 Under Pruitt’s leadership, the EPA announced a “back to
basics” agenda that emphasized cooperative federalism and “engaging” with
state and local leaders.11
Pruitt did not last long as EPA Administrator. He resigned in July 2018,
less than eighteen months after his confirmation.12 Pruitt’s deputy, Andrew
Wheeler, was then confirmed as his replacement.13 Despite the change in
leadership, the Agency’s stated commitment to cooperative federalism has
persisted. The Administration’s 2020 budget overview for the EPA identified
“cooperative federalism” as a core part of the EPA’s mission, stressing the need
to “[r]ebalance the power between Washington and the states to create tangible
environmental results for the American people.”14
While the Trump Administration emphasized the need to reorient or
rebalance federal environmental policy and restore a greater role for state
governments in environmental policymaking, the actual environmental policies
pursued by the Trump Administration have not represented a principled

8. Id. at 5.
9. Hearing on Nomination of Attorney General Pruitt to Be Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency Before the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 20 (2017) (statement of E. Scott
Pruitt, EPA Designate, Att’y Gen. of Oklahoma).
10. See Kimberly A. Strassel, Scott Pruitt’s Back-to-Basics Agenda for the EPA, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17,
2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-pruitts-back-to-basics-agenda-for-the-epa-1487375872
(noting Administrator Pruitt’s renewed focus on “federalism” in environmental policy); see also David M.
Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Federalism and the Trump Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment,
48 PUBLIUS 345, 349–50 (2018) (discussing Scott Pruitt’s environmental agenda at EPA).
11. Konisky & Woods, supra note 10, at 355.
12. Coral Davenport et al., E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics Scandals, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-epa-trump.html.
13. Lisa Friedman, Andrew Wheeler, Who Continued Environmental Rollbacks, Is Confirmed to Lead
E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/climate/andrew-wheeler-epaconfirmation.html.
14. EPA, FY 2020 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 1 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201903/documents/fy-2020-epa-bib.pdf.
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approach to environmental federalism, let alone a restoration of federal-state
relationships that could properly be called “cooperative.”15
The Trump Administration’s commitment to supporting and enhancing
state policymaking has been inconsistent and somewhat ad hoc. While there
have been fairly consistent efforts to limit federal environmental regulation,
there has been no real coordinate effort to enhance state flexibility or autonomy.
To the contrary, the Trump Administration has pressured states to alter their
internal environmental priorities and pursued multiple opportunities to inhibit
state efforts to pursue environmental priorities that differ from those of the
Trump Administration, particularly in the context of climate change. On the
whole, and despite any rhetoric to the contrary, the Trump Administration has
emphasized deregulation and support for the continued use of fossil fuels over
federalist principles.
However inconsistent the Trump Administration’s approach to
environmental federalism, there is a case to be made for reorienting the federalstate balance in environmental law. Part I of this Essay explains how current
federal environmental laws and regulations enshrine a jurisdictional mismatch
in environmental policy that undermines more effective environmental
protection efforts. In this regard, an effort to recalibrate the federal government’s
environmental efforts is long overdue.
Part II of this Essay critically assesses the Trump Administration’s
environmental policies to date in order to evaluate the extent to which they are
consistent with a genuine commitment to cooperative federalism and a
meaningful state role in the development and implementation of environmental
policy. As this Part explains, the Trump Administration’s record is decidedly
mixed from a federalism perspective. It evinces a greater commitment to
reducing regulatory burdens than to any principled conception of federalism or
the proper role of the federal government in environmental policy.
Reinvigorating federalism in environmental policy is admittedly difficult.
Much of the jurisdictional mismatch in federal environmental law is baked into
the underlying statutory architecture, much of which was enacted nearly a halfcentury ago. Nonetheless, there are steps that could be taken, both by a
committed administration as well as by Congress and the states themselves, to
help restore a meaningful cooperative federalism. Part III briefly sketches out
some of these options before the Essay concludes.

15. According to news reports, the relationship between Trump EPA and state environmental officials has
been particularly contentious. See Stephen Lee, States Demand Wheeler Explain EPA’s Stance on Federalism
(2), BLOOMBERG LAW: ENV’T & ENERGY REPORT, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/states-demand-wheeler-explain-epas-stance-on-federalism (last updated Sept. 27, 2019); Doug Obey,
EPA Spurns ECOS After State Group’s Cooperative Federalism Rebuke, INSIDEEPA (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://insideepa.com/weekly-focus/epa-spurns-ecos-after-state-group%E2%80%99s-cooperative-federalismrebuke.
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JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The core architecture of federal environmental law was erected almost fifty
years ago. Much has been learned about environmental protection and much has
changed in the interim. While substantial progress has been made addressing
many important environmental matters, serious environmental challenges
remain, particularly in areas not targeted by existing environmental laws.
Consequently, there are good reasons to question whether existing federal
programs represent the best approach to contemporary environmental problems,
particularly those administered by the EPA.16
One area ripe for reconsideration is the federal-state balance in
environmental law. Concerns about federalism in environmental law have
persisted since the 1970s, when Congress began enacting broad environmental
regulatory statutes.17 In the mid-1970s, state governments resisted the EPA’s
efforts to force more aggressive air pollution regulation.18 In the 1980s, the
Reagan Administration sought to lessen the burdens of federal environmental
regulation, albeit with limited success.19 In the 1990s, private landowners and
local governments sought relief from what they perceived as overweening and
excessive federal environmental regulation.20 During the Obama
Administration, state attorneys general and resource groups assailed ambitious
environmental regulatory initiatives, such as the Clean Power Plan and a
broadened definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water
Act.21
Given the history of opposition to federal environmental regulation,
particularly among Republican constituencies, it is unsurprising that candidate
Trump campaigned on a platform of limiting federal regulation and, upon his

16. This is not a new problem. See generally MARC K. LANDY et al., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 3 (1994) (“[T]he existing organizational
and statutory framework inhibits EPA’s ability to ask the right questions.”).
17. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253 (2004) (noting persistence of
federalism concerns in environmental policy debates); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (“[F]ederal environmental
standards have been a chronic source of friction for federal-state relations . . . .”).
18. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—Thirty-Seven
Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 345–48 (2004) (discussing state lawsuits resisting
Clean Air Act implementation and the resulting uncertainty as to whether the EPA could force states to
implement air pollution control measures).
19. See LAZARUS, supra note 17, at 99–106 (discussing Regan Administration environmental policies); see
also James P. Lester, New Federalism and Environmental Policy, 16 PUBLIUS 149, 150–51 (1986) (discussing
the Regan Administration’s effort to transfer some authority to state governments).
20. See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in
LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S’ PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 1, 16–19 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); JONATHAN H.
ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN AMERICA, at xiv-xv (1995).
21. Coral Davenport, Obama Climate Plan, Now in Court, May Hinge on Error in 1990 Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/us/politics/obama-court-clean-power-plan.html (states
challenge Clean Power Plan); Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, HILL (June 30,
2015, 12:02 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-states-challenge-obama-waterrule-in-court (states challenge WOTUS).
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election, sought to appoint critics of such regulation to key administration
posts.22
A common conservative critique of federal environmental law is that it is
overly centralized. Under this view, the federal government does too much, and
crowds out the opportunity for state governments and local communities to
pursue their own environmental priorities. Distinctly local priorities, such as the
management of local resources or land use, get subsumed by federal regulatory
edicts.
There is much truth to this critique, but it captures only part of the picture.
Federal environmental statutes and implementing regulations centralize much
environmental policy decision-making, including decision-making concerning
distinctly local matters. As a consequence, many policy decisions that are more
appropriately dealt with at the state or local level are made in Washington, D.C.
At the same time, the federal government has failed to address those sorts of
environmental problems for which federal involvement is most need and most
appropriate. The result is a pervasive jurisdictional mismatch in federal
environmental law, which undermines the more effective achievement of
environmental policy goals.23
Federal environmental statutes and regulations govern many matters for
which the costs and consequences of environmental policy decisions are
localized. The argument for federal primacy in such matters is quite weak.
Where the costs and benefits of environmental policy choices are known and
confined to a given political jurisdiction, there is little reason to believe that
transferring responsibility for making such choices to Washington, D.C. will
produce systematically better results. Indeed, given the wide geographic,
environmental, economic, and political variations across the country, there are
many reasons to suspect that federal policy decisions concerning localized
problems will actually be worse than those made by state and local officials.
Localized knowledge is difficult to accumulate and deploy from a centralized
administrative agency. Regional differences mean that federal policies will often
fail to account for local particulars. As a consequence, uniform policies are likely
to be over-protective in some areas, and under-protective in others. A policy that
effectively reduces air pollution in one part of the country, such as New York
City or Atlanta, may not work as well in parts of the country with different mixes
of pollution sources, different topography, and a different climate. Further, the
likelihood that “one size fits all” federal policies operate as “one size fits
nobody” will only increase over time, as environmental measures experience

22. See generally JAMES MORTON TURNER & ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE REPUBLICAN REVERSAL:
CONSERVATIVES AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM NIXON TO TRUMP (2018) (discussing the history and
development of opposition to federal environmental regulation within the Republican Party); Jonathan H. Adler,
The Conservative Record on Environmental Policy, 39 NEW ATLANTIS 133 (2013) (discussing the same).
23. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005) (explaining the consequences of jurisdictional mismatch on environmental law and
policy).
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diminishing marginal returns and regional variation becomes more important on
the margin.
Prioritization is necessary. Federal regulatory resources are necessarily
limited. As a consequence, regulatory agencies can maximize the benefits of
their regulatory efforts insofar as they concentrate or target their efforts where
federal intervention is likely to do the most good, and the least harm.
Accordingly, federal regulatory resources are best utilized if they are targeted at
those areas where there is an identifiable federal interest or where the federal
government is in a particularly good position to advance environmental
protection, particularly given available alternatives.
Federal regulatory agencies will often have greater scientific and technical
expertise than their state and local counterparts, but this does not necessarily
translate into superior policymaking. The technical expertise necessary for
identifying various trade-offs at the margin does not translate into a superior
ability to determine which trade-offs should be made, particularly insofar as such
choices implicate subjective value preferences about how to prioritize
competing goods when resources are scarce. Should marginal resources be
devoted to controlling emissions of ozone precursors, limiting nutrient runoff
into local streams, ensuring proper remediation of an abandoned waste site, or
expanding access to health care or nutritional programs? Such choices
necessarily implicate normative concerns that are beyond any scientific or
technical analysis. Superior expertise certainly supports an argument that federal
agencies should assist state and local policymakers and help ensure that
environmental policy decisions are more informed, but not that state and local
policy choices should be made in Washington, D.C.
One prominent justification for federal environmental regulation of
localized pollution concerns is that the lack of a federal “floor” could lead to a
destructive “race-to-the-bottom,” in which states adopt suboptimally lax
environmental protections in a futile effort to attract off-setting levels of
economic investment.24 As President Richard Nixon warned in 1970, without
stringent federal environmental standards, “states and communities that require
such controls find themselves at a . . . disadvantage in attracting industry,
against more permissive rivals.”25
24. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22–25 (2003) (discussing scholars’ support for federal
environmental regulation out of fears of race to the bottom); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER
HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting the “widespread belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of
a mutually-destructive ‘race to the bottom’”); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 570, 628 (1997) (“Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the central
underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United States.”); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 280–85 (1997)
(detailing the theory). Others have noted the difficulties that arise with state implementation of federal
regulations, see generally Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
25. Special Message to the Congress on Environmental Quality, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Feb. 10, 1970); see
also H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, at 3 (1970) (claiming federal environmental standards would “preclude”
competition among the states to attract industries “without assuring” enforcement of emission standards).
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The race-to-the-bottom theory presumes that interjurisdictional
competition creates a prisoner’s dilemma for states. Each state wants to attract
industry for the economic benefits that it provides. Each state also wishes to
maintain an optimal level of environmental protection. However, in order to
attract industry, the theory holds, states will lower environmental safeguards so
as to reduce the regulatory burden they impose upon firms. This competition
exerts downward pressure on environmental safeguards as firms seek to locate
in states where regulatory burdens are the lowest, and states seek to attract
industry by lessening the economic burden of environmental safeguards.
Because the potential benefits of lax regulation are concentrated among
relatively few firms, these firms can effectively oppose the general public’s
preference for environmental protection regulation. This will lead to social
welfare losses even if environmental harm does not spill over from one state to
another. The result, according to the theory, is the systematic under-regulation
of environmental harms, and a need for federal intervention.26
The race-to-the-bottom theory may have had some basis in the 1960s and
1970s, but there is little reason to believe that this dynamic inhibits state
regulatory efforts today, particularly given how aggressive many states are in
environmental policy. Empirical evidence that states race to relax their
environmental regulations in pursuit of outside investment is decidedly lacking.
If the prospect of interstate competition discourages state-level environmental
regulation, it is hard to explain why state environmental regulation often
preceded federal intervention and why many states adopt more stringent
measures than federal regulations require. Numerous studies have been
conducted attempting to determine whether a race-to-the-bottom can be
observed in the context of environmental regulation, and they have generally
failed to find any evidence that environmental quality worsens when states are
given more flexibility to set their own priorities.27 Indeed, some studies have
found precisely the opposite: that when states have more flexibility to set their
own environmental priorities they increase their efforts.28
26. Although theoretically plausible, the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis has come under serious attack. See,
e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). Among other works, Revesz draws upon
Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or
Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988). For this Author’s view, see Adler, supra note 23, at 151–
54; see also Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental
Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 79–80 (2007).
27. For a review of the available empirical literature, see Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1669 (2014); see also Bruce G. Carruthers &
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards,
54 J. ECON. LIT. 52 (2016); Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT
ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 11–17 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) (summarizing
empirical literature).
28. See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism, 43 J.
REGIONAL SCI. 711, 727–29 (2003); PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 180–81 (2004) (finding states are
more likely to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions taken in neighboring
states, and concluding that “the race to the bottom is not a factor here”); id. at 191–92 (finding same pattern in
groundwater regulation).
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None of the above should be taken as an argument against all federal
environmental regulation. For just as the federal government is overly
interventionist in localized environmental concerns, the federal government is
unduly absent in areas where a federal presence is most necessary. That is, the
undue centralization of some environmental concerns co-exists with substantial
federal abdication from concerns the federal government should be addressing.
The federal government devotes relatively little of its regulatory resources on
those matters for which the federal government possesses a comparative
advantage and abdicates its responsibility to provide the data and knowledge
base necessary for successful environmental regulation at all levels of
government.
It is often remarked that environmental problems do not respect state
borders. This is unquestionably true, and the observation provides ample
justification for federal measures to address transboundary pollution problems.29
Where pollution or other environmental problems span jurisdictional borders
there is less reason to believe state and local jurisdictions will respond
adequately.
Consider a simple transboundary pollution problem involving two states,
A and B. When economic activity in State A causes pollution in State B, State
A is unlikely to adopt measures to prevent the resulting environmental harm
because it would bear the primary costs of any such regulatory measures,
without capturing the primary benefits. Put simply, State A is unlikely to impose
costs on itself to benefit State B. Absent some external controls or dispute
resolution system, the presence of interstate spillovers can actually encourage
polices that externalize environmental harms, such as subsidizing development
near jurisdictional borders so as to ensure that environmental harms fall
disproportionately “downstream.” Policymakers in State B may wish to take
action, but they will be unable to control pollution created in State A without
State A’s cooperation. Even where polluting activity imposes substantial
environmental harm within State A, the externalization of a portion of the harm
is likely to result in the adoption of less optimal environmental controls.
Despite the need for federal involvement to help protect downwind and
downstream jurisdictions from their polluting neighbors, interstate spillovers
have been largely an afterthought in federal environmental law. Of all the pages
of the U.S. Code devoted to environmental protection, only a small portion
focuses on the control of interstate pollution.30 Worse, what provisions exist
have (until recently) rarely been invoked, and even more rarely invoked due to

29. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932
(1997) (“Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to
present a clear case for shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.”).
30. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2341, 2349–61 (1998) (discussing the few provisions pertaining to ambient and emission standards, tall-stacks,
acid rain, and interstate spillovers).
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federal initiative. Downwind states have been more aggressive at seeking to
control interstate spillovers than has the federal government.31
Global climate change is perhaps the most pressing environmental concern
of the twenty-first century. As a global phenomenon, climate change does not
respect national boundaries, let alone those of the individual states. At the same
time, there is little that any individual state can do to influence greenhouse gas
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere.32 This is a policy area in which the
federal government is clearly better positioned than state governments to have
an influence, and yet no portion of federal environmental law enacted by
Congress squarely and expressly authorizes regulation of GHG emissions.
Insofar as the federal government has legal authority to regulate here, it is only
because it was dragged to court by, among other litigants, individual states.33
The problem is not that the federal government does too much, or that it
does too little. Rather, the problem is that the federal government does too much
of the wrong things, and too little of the right things, to maximize the
effectiveness of the federal government’s environmental protection efforts.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
While Trump Administration officials have expressed an interest in
restoring a more proper federal-state balance in environmental regulation, the
Administration’s actions have evinced a greater desire to curtail federal
environmental regulation than to focus federal efforts on interstate concerns or
to empower states to adopt their own regulatory policies. While the Trump
Administration has sought to scale back some of the Obama Administration’s
more ambitious regulatory initiatives, it has not established a new set of
regulatory priorities in which federalism appears to play a major role. To the
contrary, while scaling back climate change initiatives, the EPA has resisted
efforts to curtail cross-boundary air pollution while simultaneously threatening
sanctions against state governments that have not been sufficiently aggressive at
controlling local air and water pollution.34
The EPA’s approach to Clean Air Act (CAA) enforcement highlights the
failure to make cooperative federalism a core component of Trump
Administration policy in a serious way. Since 2017, the EPA has taken action
31. As even those who support a fairly aggressive federal environmental presence acknowledge, “EPA has
not done a very good job of addressing transboundary pollution.” Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30:
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086, 11092 (2001).
32. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155
U. PENN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2007) (“It is . . . well understood that these state-level efforts, even those of large
states such as California, will have little impact on global emissions and hence little impact on global climate.”).
33. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding, among other things, that the EPA possess
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act).
34. See, e.g., Alexa Díaz & Anna M. Phillips, EPA to California: You’re Also “Failing” to Meet Water
Pollution Standards, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-0926/epa-trump-california-water-pollution-homelessness; Juliet Eilperin et al., EPA Tells California It Is “Failing
to Meet Its Obligations” to Protect the Environment, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019, 9:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/epa-tells-california-it-is-failing-to-meet-its-obligationsto-stem-water-pollution/2019/09/26/b3ffca1e-dfac-11e9-8dc8-498eabc129a0_story.html.
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against states that have failed to comply with federal requirements for local air
pollution control while resisting efforts to control transboundary air pollution
that makes it more difficult for downwind states to meet federal air quality
standards. Although California has a reputation as a particularly aggressive
environmental regulator, it has not kept pace with the CAA’s requirements to
submit adequate State Implementation Plans (SIP) for criteria air pollutants
throughout the state. In September 2019, the EPA threatened to invoke the
CAA’s sanction provisions, and potentially suspend federal highway funding to
the state, if California did not clear the backlog.35 Yet when northeastern states
sought the Administration’s help in controlling upwind air pollution that makes
it more difficult for downwind states to develop and implement their own
compliant SIPs, the Administration dragged its heels, forcing downwind states
to seek relief in federal court.36
Among the Administration’s greatest environmental accomplishments to
date are successful efforts to accelerate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites
under the federal Superfund program,37 yet it is not clear why such cleanups
would be a particularly high priority for an administration that touts cooperative
federalism as a core policy principle. Barring extreme circumstances, the
cleanup and restoration of hazardous waste sites is the sort of environmental
concern state and local governments are well able to handle.38 A “National
Priorities List” of waste sites that are truly “national priorities” should be rather
short.39 It is one thing for the EPA to provide technical assistance and aid
emergency cleanup, as was done when the Superfund program began. It is quite
35. See Juliet Eilperin & Dino Grandoni, Trump Officials Threaten to Withhold Highway Funding from
California for Its “Chronic Air Quality Problems”, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2019, 8:14 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/09/24/trump-officials-threaten-withhold-highway-funds-cali
fornia-its-chronic-air-quality-problems/; see also Marianne Lavelle, How Trump Is Using Environment Law to
Attack California. It’s Not Just About Auto Standards Anymore., INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04112019/trump-war-california-auto-standards-environment-violationsjustice-department-wildfires. From a federalism perspective, it might have been interesting for California to call
the Administration’s bluff, as there is a serious argument that the CAA’s highway fund sanctions are
unconstitutional under South Dakota v. Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius. See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart,
Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB
v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 701–13 (2017) (explaining why the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions
are likely unconstitutional). Subsequent news reports, however, indicate that California and the EPA worked
cooperatively to address the apparent SIP backlog. See Michael Wilner, EPA Sees California Progress on Clean
Air Backlog After Threats to Highway Funding, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/
news/politics-government/white-house/article239004303.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2020).
36. See New York v. EPA, 781 Fed. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (mem.) (per curiam) (rejecting EPA “close
out rule” for failing to require upwind states to control emissions of ozone precursors affecting ozone levels in
downwind states prior to 2021); see also New York v. EPA, 921 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (challenging EPA’s
decision not to expand Ozone Transport Region to include more upwind states).
37. See Press Release, EPA, Superfund Task Force Issues Final Report and Announces Plans to Continue
Program Improvements Moving Forward (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/superfund-taskforce-issues-final-report-and-announces-plans-continue-program.
38. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 724 (2008).
39. EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler remarked that “[a] site on the National Priorities List should be
just that—a national priority.” Andrew Wheeler, Adm’r, EPA, Address at Case Western University School of
Law (Oct. 18, 2019) (copy of remarks on file with Author).
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another for the federal government to take the lead in cleaning up individual
sites, and continuing to add sites to the federal program decades after any
emergency justification has passed.40 As with air pollution, the EPA is showing
more interest in the local than in those concerns that are more properly national.
Looking at some specific policy areas can shed light on the extent to which
a concern for federalism has informed the Trump Administration’s
environmental policies. This Essay will examine two: The Revision of the
Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United States” under the Clean Water
Act and the Revocation of California’s Waiver from Federal Preemption of
Vehicle Emission Standards.
A. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
Revising the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States”
(WOTUS) was a top deregulatory priority of the Trump Administration.
Candidate Trump had inveighed against the Obama Administration’s expansive
reinterpretation of WOTUS,41 and preliminary court rulings suggested the prior
rule was legally vulnerable.42 Therefore, it was no surprise that the Trump
Administration took action to both rescind the WOTUS rule adopted by the
Obama Administration in 2015 and promulgate a narrower WOTUS definition
of its own.43
The federal WOTUS definition is important because it delineates the scope
of federal regulatory authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The Act
prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” without an applicable
permit.44 “Discharge of any pollutant” is defined as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,”45 and the term “pollutant”
is defined broadly to include dredged material, rock, sand, solid and industrial
waste, and chemical waste, among other things.46 Of particularly importance for
the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction, the CWA defines “navigable waters”
as “waters of the United States.”47 Although the CWA identifies the
congressional purposes that motivated the statute’s passage, the law itself does
40. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Updates Superfund National Priorities List, Advancing the Agency’s
Commitment to Protect Human Health and Expedite Cleanups Across the Country (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.
epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-updates-superfund-national-priorities-list-advancing-agencys-commitment-protect.
41. See infra note 2 and accompanying text.
42. See North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D. 2015); Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp.
3d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Ga. 2018); Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1343–44 (S.D. Ga. 2019); Texas v.
EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497, 506 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
43. This process was initiated by an executive order. Executive Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. 296 (2018).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2018).
45. Id. § 1362(12). The full definition reads:
The term “discharge of a pollutant” and the term “discharge of pollutants” each means (A) any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant
to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other
floating craft.
Id.
46. Id. § 1362(6).
47. Id. § 1362(7).
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not otherwise define the scope of this term, so how it is interpreted by the
agencies charged with enforcing the CWA—the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers—is key.
In 1975, a federal district court held that the CWA’s prohibition applied
beyond traditionally navigable waters and included wetlands.48 In the 1980s, the
Army Corps and EPA promulgated regulations defining “waters of the United
States” to include 1) all waters used for interstate commerce;49 2) all interstate
waters and wetlands;50 3) all tributaries or impoundments of such waters;51 and,
most significantly:
[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes,
wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any
such waters: (i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers
for recreational or other purposes; or (ii) From which fish or shellfish are or
could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are
used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in interstate
commerce.52

This definition explicitly included “wetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands).”53 This WOTUS definition asserted
federal regulatory authority over a substantial portion of the country.54
This WOTUS definition was predictably controversial and became a legal
and political flashpoint. The first Bush Administration’s issuance of a revised
wetlands delineation manual in 1989 helped spark the property rights movement
in the early 1990s.55 This, in turn, led to substantial amounts of litigation, as
landowners challenged the authority of the Army Corps and EPA to regulate
their land.56 Although the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” as “waters”

48. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
49. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (1986).
50. Id. § 328.3(a)(2).
51. Id. § 328.3(a)(4)–(5).
52. Id. § 328.3(a)(3).
53. Id. § 328.3(a)(7).
54. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (plurality opinion) (noting agencies asserted
jurisdiction over “270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands” across the country).
55. See Warren Brookes, The Strange Case of the Glancing Geese, FORBES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 104–06
(reporting that the 1989 Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands “extended the
reach of the 1972 Clean Water Act,” prompting “angry protest from traditional Republican constituencies,
farmers, businesses, real estate developers, landowners and local governments”); see also Richard Miniter,
Muddy Waters: The Quagmire of Wetlands Regulation, 56 POL’Y REV. 70, 70 (1991); Marzulla, supra note 20,
at 17.
56. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154, 4,159 (proposed Feb. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401)
(“From the earliest rulemaking efforts following adoption of the 1972 CWA amendments, to the agencies [sic]
most recent attempt to define ‘waters of the United States’ in 2015, the sparse statutory definition has spurred
substantial litigation testing the meaning of the phrase.”). For an overview of some of the early litigation
challenging the scope of federal regulatory authority under the CWA, see Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands,
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indicates that federal regulatory authority extends beyond navigable-in-fact
waters, many landowners and industry groups objected to the regulation of lands
and remote waterbodies as “waters of the United States.”
Opponents of an expansive definition argued that a broad WOTUS
definition exceeded the scope of statutory authorization and stretched the
boundaries of federal regulatory authority under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court ultimately agreed. In 2001 and 2006, the Court concluded that the EPA
and Army Corps had gone overboard in their assertion of regulatory authority.
First, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC), the Court rejected the agencies’ assertion of CWA
jurisdiction over waters that lacked a “significant nexus” to navigable waters.57
Specifically, the Court concluded that an isolated intrastate pond is not included
within the “waters of the United States” even though it constitutes a “water” and
is within the United States.58
Five years later, in Rapanos v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the
central holding of SWANCC.59 Here, a majority of the Court (albeit in two
separate opinions) agreed that “waters of the United States” only extend to those
waters and wetlands that have a “significant nexus” to truly navigable waters.60
Although the two opinions compromising the Rapanos majority differed in some
respects, they both acknowledged meaningful limits on federal regulatory
jurisdiction and the constitutional concerns lurking in the background.61
SWANCC and Rapanos generated a great deal of uncertainty about the
scope of CWA jurisdiction. The George W. Bush Administration considered
adopting a new regulation to define WOTUS in light of the Court’s guidance,62
but demurred when it became clear any such effort would be controversial.63
While regulated waters subject to the CWA’s permitting requirements extend
Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetlands
Regulation, 29 ENVTL L. 1 (1999).
57. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 167–
68 (2001).
58. Id. at 171–74.
59. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715.
60. Id. at 755, 759. In his controlling concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded, “to constitute
‘navigable waters’ under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were
navigable in fact, or that could reasonably be so made.” Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The plurality
opinion authored by Justice Scalia advocated for an even narrower approach to jurisdiction. See id. at 757 (lower
courts must determine whether wetlands in question were “adjacent” to waters with “relatively permanent flow”)
Id. at 757 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
61. For a fuller examination of each decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The
Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205 (2001); Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with
Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006).
62. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of ‘‘Waters
of the United States,” 68 Fed Reg. 1991, 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003) (asking for comments on the scope of the CAA
following SWANCC).
63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-297, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF ENGINEERS
NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION (2004) (“The ANPRM
generated approximately 133,000 comments representing widely differing views. The agencies decided in
December 2003 that they would not proceed with a rulemaking.”).
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beyond traditionally navigable waters to some degree, there are also meaningful
limits that fall well short of every hydrologically significant part of the United
States.
In order to reduce uncertainty, and reassert broad federal regulatory
jurisdiction, the Obama Administration promulgated a new WOTUS definition
in 2015.64 This definition sought to identify those hydrological connections that,
alone or in combination, sufficiently effect navigable waters so as to provide a
sufficient basis for federal regulatory jurisdiction. Among other things, the 2015
regulation adopted an expansive interpretation of those waters and wetlands that
could be deemed “neighboring” other jurisdictional waters so to come within
federal regulatory control.65
As soon as the 2015 WOTUS rule was promulgated, litigation ensued,
much of it filed by state attorneys general who objected to the Army Corps and
EPA’s aggressive assertion of federal regulatory authority. In August 2015,
before the rule could even take effect, the first of those suits bore fruit, as a
federal district court in North Dakota entered a preliminary injunction against
the rule, concluding the thirteen plaintiff states in that case were likely to prevail
in their claim that the agencies “violated [their] Congressional grant of
authority” in the rule.66 Among other things, the court concluded that the new
WOTUS definition likely encompassed “vast numbers of waters that are
unlikely to have a nexus to navigable waters,” and therefore stretched beyond
the agencies’ statutory authority.67
Additional suits were filed. In the end, over half of the fifty states were
plaintiffs challenging the 2015 WOTUS.68 After significant legal wrangling over
where challenges to the WOTUS rule should be filed,69 courts in three
jurisdictions concluded the Army Corps and EPA had exceeded the scope of
their lawful authority in promulgating the rule.70
In February 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order on
“Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing
the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule,” directing the EPA and Army Corps to
revise the WOTUS definition.71 This order specifically called upon the agencies
to give “due regard” for the constitutional role of the states and encouraged
adoption of a final rule that hewed closely to the narrow opinion of federal

64. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015)
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
65. Id. at 37, 104–05.
66. North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D. 2015).
67. Id. at 1056. The court also found portions of the rule were likely not a “logical outgrowth” of the
proposed rule, as is generally required under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 1058.
68. See Cama, supra note 21.
69. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018) (holding challenges to the
WOTUS definition must be filed in federal district courts, as opposed to directly in the circuit courts of appeal).
70. See Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1360, 1364 (S.D. Ga. 2018); Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F.
Supp. 3d 1336, 1343–44 (S.D. Ga. 2019); Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497, 499–500 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
71. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. 296, 296–97 (2018).
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regulatory jurisdiction outlined by Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Rapanos.72
The agencies responded by first rescinding the 2015 WOTUS definition.73
Then, in January 2020, the agencies promulgated a new, narrower definition.74
This new definition, as explained by the agencies, was intended to pursue the
CWA’s water pollution control objectives while also following Congress’s
direction to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and “to plan the
development and use . . . of land and water resources.”75 Asserting that CWA
jurisdiction is tied to Congress’s “traditional jurisdiction over navigable waters,”
the new definition sought to ensure that assertions of jurisdiction are related to
a significant nexus with such waters.76 It further sought, as much as possible, to
“establish categorical bright lines” so as to provide “clarity and predictability”
for regulatory and regulated alike.77
These emphases ensured that the new definition would be less expansive
than that adopted in 2015, thereby leaving greater room for state governments
to exercise primary authority over land and water within their boundaries. The
new WOTUS definition includes all those waters traditionally considered to be
“navigable waters,” tributaries to such waters, and some lakes, ponds, and
ditches, and wetlands adjacent to all such waters. The proposed definition is both
more clearly defined and more circumscribed than that promulgated by the
Army Corps and EPA in 1986 and 2015. As such, this definition is more
consistent with the text of the CWA and applicable Supreme Court precedent
than prior definitions. In this regard, the new WOTUS definition also embodies
federalism principles in that it does not presume that the federal government
must bear primary responsibility for the protection of water quality, and
recognizes that not all waters (or wetlands) within the United States are “waters
of the United States.”
At the same time, some of the rule’s details suggest the final contours of
the rule were motivated as much with reducing federal regulatory jurisdiction
for its own sake as they were with trying to strike a principled balance between
federal and state authority. The rule shows little concern for the need to focus
federal regulatory resources on those waters and wetlands in which there is a
distinct federal interest, such as where there are transboundary resources or

72. Id.
73. Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States’’—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 84 Fed. Reg.
56,626, 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328; 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230,
232, 300, 302, 401). The agencies also sought, unsuccessfully, to delay the effective date of the 2015 WOTUS
rule. See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 961 (D.S.C. 2018) (rejecting WOTUS
suspension rule).
74. See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg.
22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328; 44 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230,
232, 300, 302, 401).
75. Id. at 22,260 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2018)).
76. Id. at 22,251.
77. Id. at 22,325.
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interstate spillovers. For example, there is an undeniable federal interest in
regulating the filling or dredging of wetlands where such activities would cause
or contribute to interstate pollution problems or compromise water quality in
interstate waterways. Where the effects of wetland modification are more
localized, the federal interest is less clear. Not coincidentally, in the latter case,
the legal basis for federal jurisdiction is also more attenuated.
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this is the final rule’s exclusion
of interstate waters as a distinct category of waters included within the definition
of “Waters of the United States.” This omission is concerning on both statutory
and policy grounds. As a statutory matter, the category of waters considered to
be “waters of the United States” would seem to include interstate waters almost
by definition. After all, what are “waters of the United States” if not those waters
that concern, or are contained in, more than one of the United States? Indeed, it
would seem that of all non-navigable waters, those that touch and concern more
than one state fit more securely within the definition of “waters of the United
States” than those contained wholly within a single state. The latter may simply
be “waters of the state.” The former cannot.
The exclusion is perhaps more inexplicable on federalism grounds, as
interstate waters are precisely those waters that are least likely to be adequately
protected by state and local governments acting on their own. There is ample
evidence that state and other efforts to address water pollution began to produce
benefits prior to the enactment of the CWA.78 The history of state-level wetland
regulation further suggests a great willingness on the part of states to act in
defense of wetland resources within their boundaries.79 Yet there is little reason
to expect states to be as aggressive where the benefits of any conservation
actions they may take will accrue to other jurisdictions.
Because of the particular problems that result from interstate spillovers,
and the incentives faced by states that share transboundary or interstate water
resources, the EPA and Army Corps should pay particular attention to whether
the proposed rule provides adequate protection for interstate waters. It may be
true, as the agencies maintained in the rulemaking, that most interstate waters
will be otherwise included within the definition of the “waters of the United
States,” yet the agencies provided little support for this assertion. Indeed, the
agencies acknowledged they “lacked the ability” to determine the effect of this
exclusion.
Given that interstate waters are readily included within the statutory phrase
and that the nature of transboundary resources makes federal action particularly
appropriate, the agencies would have demonstrated a principled commitment to

78. See, e.g., David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand
for Water Quality, 134 Q. J. ECON. 349, 373 (2018) (finding improvements in water quality between 1962 and
1972 and “no obvious evidence of a mean shift or trend break in water pollution around 1972”); A. Myrick
Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul
Portney & Roger C. Dower eds., 1990) (noting pre-CWA improvements in water quality).
79. This history is summarized in Adler, supra note 56, at 41–54.
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federalism by including interstate waters in the revised WOTUS definition, at
least presumptively.
Adopting a clearer and more focused definition of “waters of the United
States” that provides regulatory certainty is certainly beneficial for the regulated
community and will give state governments more leeway to set their own
environmental policy priorities on the margin. There are reasons to believe that
state policymakers will be more likely to act when they are more certain of the
potential benefits of their interventions. A clearer and more circumscribed
definition may also help facilitate environmental conservation efforts by other
non-federal actors. Yet the revised definition, as promulgated, is disappointing
in its adherence to principles of federalism.
B.

CALIFORNIA VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARD WAIVER

The Trump Administration has also shown little regard for federalist
principles and state prerogatives in its decision to revoke California’s waiver
from preemption of vehicle emission standards under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Under the CAA, states are generally precluded from adopting their own
vehicle-emission standards.80 In Congress’s judgment, allowing different states
to adopt different rules would create a costly and confusing regulatory
patchwork for automakers and increase prices.81 Complying with a uniform
national standard is easier for automakers to meet, as it ensures any car produced
for the U.S. market can be sold anywhere in the country. Indeed, the automakers’
desire to avoid the possibility of variable state standards is the reason Congress
adopted preemptive federal vehicle emission standards in the first place.82
California, however, is a special case. Because California adopted its first
vehicle emission controls before the CAA was adopted, its authority to enact its
own vehicle emission standards is grandfathered, subject to certain conditions.83
Specifically, the CAA allows California to obtain a waiver of preemption from
the EPA for standards that are “at least as protective” as the applicable federal

80. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2018) (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt
to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines subject to this part.”).
81. See Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Congress in
1967 expressed its intent to occupy the regulatory role over emissions control to the exclusion of all the states—
all, that is, except California” due to “the spectre of an anarchic patchwork of federal and state regulatory
programs . . . .”).
82. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 330 (1985) (discussing the role of the automakers in the
enactment of the first federal vehicle emission standards). The major U.S. automakers’ desire to avoid multiple
vehicle emission standards also served as leverage when the Obama Administration sought to set the first federal
greenhouse gas emission standards for motor vehicles. See Adam J. White, Obama’s Cynical Energy Agenda,
NAT’L AFF., Summer 2012, at 16, 24–26.
83. The language in the U.S. Code does not specifically mention California. Rather, one condition for a
state having the ability to set its own vehicle emission standards is that it had adopted its first standards prior to
March 30, 1966, and California is the only state that complies with this condition. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)
(2018).
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standards.84 If, however, the EPA determines that California does not “need such
State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,” the waiver
application must be denied.85
Once a waiver is obtained, and only then, other states have the option of
adopting California’s standards as their own as part of a CAA SIP.86 In effect,
once California obtains a waiver, other states are given the choice of adopting
California’s standards or defaulting to whatever federal standards are in place.
For the automakers, this means complying with either one uniform federal
standard, or two standards—the EPA’s and California’s—that are applicable on
a state-by-state basis.
Up until 2008, when California sought a vehicle emission standard waiver,
the EPA typically obliged, largely due to California’s distinct—and distinctly
severe—urban air pollution problems.87 Although the major U.S. automakers
have often opposed such waivers, allowing California to adopt specialized rules
to address smog and soot is in line with the relevant CAA provisions, and
preserves California as something of a laboratory for emission control policies.
Prior to 2008, however, California always sought waivers for vehicle emission
controls concerning traditional air pollutants.
GHG emission regulations present quite different considerations from
traditional air pollutants because their effects, unlike those of particulates or
smog-forming emissions, are not localized.88 Climate change is a global
phenomenon. The relevant airshed is not the Los Angeles Basin or South Coast
Air Quality Management District, but Earth’s entire atmosphere. The degree of
warming experienced by California is a consequence of atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHGs, not local conditions or
controls. Thus, even if the adoption of statewide GHG controls were likely to
reduce greenhouse warming, they would not address any distinctly Californiabased concern. California may face specific threats from the effects of global
warming, but the climate-forcing of carbon dioxide and other GHGs is dispersed
throughout the world. California was granted the ability to seek waivers to enact
measures addressing pollution problems in California, not a roving authority to
drive environmental policy for the nation as a whole.
In 2008, the Bush Administration denied California’s request for a GHG
emission standard waiver.89 Specifically, the Bush EPA concluded that
California did not need to limit GHG emissions in order “to meet compelling

84. Id.
85. Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
86. See id. § 7507(2).
87. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
281, 293 (2003) (discussing the history of EPA approvals of California waiver requests).
88. For a broader and more extended discussion of how federalism principles are implicated by climate
policies, see Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP.
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 443 (2008).
89. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
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and extraordinary conditions” within the state.90 Rather, any benefits from such
emission controls would be felt globally. Under the Bush Administration’s
interpretation of the CAA, this required rejecting the waiver.91
This position was based upon a plausible interpretation of the CAA’s
statutory language, as applied to GHGs. Yet it was not the last word on
California’s waiver request. After the 2008 election, the Obama Administration
reversed course. Almost immediately after taking office, the Obama
Administration initiated a review of the waiver denial.92 The EPA reconsidered
and granted the waiver request in July 2009,93 before using the prospect of two
separate vehicle emission standards as leverage to induce the automakers
acquiescence to federal GHG standards.94 Although industry groups filed suit
against the waiver grant, the challenge ultimately failed.95 A subsequent waiver
was also granted in 2013.96
Like the Obama Administration before it, the Trump Administration has
also sought to revisit its predecessor’s interpretation of the CAA’s waiver
provisions. As part of the Trump Administration’s revision and reevaluation of
federal automobile fuel economy standards, it concluded that California’s GHG
emission standards are preempted and the waiver must be withdrawn.97
According to the EPA and the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA), allowing California to maintain separate standards
would prevent the adoption of a nationally uniform fuel economy standard for
new vehicles. Under this interpretation, any state-level GHG emission standards
are preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), without
regard for the existence of or eligibility for a CAA waiver.98 The EPCA

90. Id.
91. Id. at 12,156–57.
92. See Remarks on Energy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 14 (Jan. 26, 2009).
93. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and
Subsequent Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744 (July 8,
2009).
94. White, supra note 82.
95. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing the suit on the
grounds that claim moot). It is of note that this suit was filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and auto dealers,
not the automakers, as the major automakers had agreed to drop their legal challenges as part of their negotiations
with the White House. See White, supra note 82.
96. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean
Car Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for
2017 and Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2,112, 2,112 (Jan. 9, 2013).
97. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed.
Reg. 51,310, 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533).
98. For a more extensive discussion of the EPCA preemption question, see Alice Kaswan, Statutory
Purpose in the Rollback Wars, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1179 (2020).
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precludes any state rules “related to” automotive fuel economy,99 and controlling
a vehicle’s GHG emissions necessarily influences that vehicles fuel economy.100
There is a reasonable argument that nationally uniform vehicle emission
standards are preferable to regionally variable standards, particularly for
globally dispersed pollutants like GHGs. Unlike with traditional pollutants, the
accumulation of which in the ambient air directly cause localized air pollution
problems, the costs of variable standards are not offset by local environmental
benefits. For this reason, a presumptive preference for allowing states to set
separate standards might yield to concerns for the costs of variability. Yet the
Trump Administration was not content with preempting California’s GHG
emission standards. In revoking California’s latest waiver, it acted to limit
California’s ability to address California-specific air pollution problems as well.
In addition to revoking California’s waiver to set GHG emission standards,
the EPA also revoked California’s waiver to set a separate standard requiring the
sale of “Zero Emission Vehicles” (ZEVs).101 Even though such standards do not
prescribe any particular GHG emission level per mile or gallon of fuel consumed
(or a particular fuel economy standard), the EPA and NHTSA have concluded
that a ZEV standard is also preempted by EPCA and not eligible for a CAA
waiver. This conclusion is analytically weak, and appears to be quite a break
from the Administration’s stated federalism principles.
The California ZEV requirement forces automakers to sell a minimum
amount of ZEVs as a percentage of their overall vehicle sales within the state.102
In practice, this forces automakers to cross-subsidize ZEVs by lowering their
prices and making up any losses by increasing prices on other vehicles.
Understandably, these rules are not popular with the major automakers. The
ZEV requirement does not, however, force automakers to design and market a
separate set of vehicles meeting a separate set of fuel economy requirements.
However unpopular the ZEV mandates may be among automakers, they fit
more comfortably with the CAA’s waiver provisions than GHG emission
controls. This is because ZEVs do far more than reduce GHG emissions. They
reduce emissions of traditional pollutants as well, facilitating California’s
compliance with other CAA requirements.103 Thus, California has a strong
argument that these standards are needed to control pollution within the state
and the claim such rules are “related to” fuel economy rules is more of a stretch.
99. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018). The statute explains that:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State or a
political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy
standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy
standard under this chapter.
Id.
100. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,315 (discussing relationship between automotive fuel economy and GHG
emissions).
101. Id. at 51,310.
102. See id. at 51,330 (noting for the 2018–2025 model years, ZEVs would have to account for up to fifteen
percent of each automaker’s fleet).
103. See id. at 51,329 (discussing the California Air Resources Board’s reliance on ZEV requirements as
one part of a strategy to ensure CAA compliance, in addition to reducing GHG emissions).
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If this part of the Trump proposal remains in the final rule, it will be more
vulnerable in court.
Whatever the legal merits of the new EPA and NHTSA positions may be,
from a federalism standpoint it seems incongruous to stretch legal authorities so
as to preclude California from exercising the autonomy to set vehicle emission
standards it had exercised for over forty years.
The strongest federalist argument for preempting California’s standards is
that allowing one state to set its own vehicle emission standards risks
Balkanizing the national market for automobiles and will impose costs on
consumers in other jurisdictions. Because California represents a particularly
large proportion of the national market, California’s standards could become de
facto national rules. Rather than make different cars from different markets,
automakers may choose to sell California-compliant vehicles nationwide. This
is plausible, but the threat to federalism values may be overstated. Insofar as the
relevant standards impose requirements on the fleet average of vehicles sold,
automakers retain flexibility. If it is less expensive to offer different vehicle
mixes in different states, that’s what the automakers will do. If not, they won’t.
Either way, no other state will be forced to adopt California’s rules.
Allowing different jurisdictions to adopt different rules can well impose
costs on nationwide firms, but that’s a cost of doing business in a diverse
compound public. The reality is that California has different environmental
problems and preferences than the rest of the nation. Just as California should
not be able to impose its preferences on the rest of the nation, it should not be
prevented from adopting those rules California voters are willing to accept—and
were automakers willing to let California consumers bear the costs of their
state’s own policies, that might temper their environmental appetites.
If there is a problem in federal environmental law, it is not that California
is given too much autonomy to adopt its own environmental rules, but that other
states are given too little. If anything, the CAA waiver provisions are too narrow,
insofar as they only apply to one specific regulatory program within the broader
federal regulatory monolith. A broader waiver provision that gave states more
leeway to experiment with alternative approaches to environmental protection
across the board would do more to encourage regulatory innovation and defuse
political conflicts over regulation than funneling every major environmental
policy question through Washington, D.C.
III. TOWARD REAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM
The Trump Administration’s cooperative federalism rhetoric has not been
matched by a demonstrated commitment to federalism in practice. The current
EPA departs from federalist principles where doing so facilitates desired
deregulation, but also to enforce federal standards on local communities. It is
not a principled environmental federalism.
To be fair, the Trump Administration is hardly the first administration to
fail to incorporate federalism principles into environmental policy. Much of the
jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy is hard-wired into the various
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federal environmental statutes. Anything more than marginal readjustments
would require revisiting and revising large aspects of federal environmental
statutes, and Congress has shown relatively little interest in recent years in such
a weighty task.
It may be possible to induce greater Congressional attention to reforming
federal environmental laws by incentivizing more regular reauthorization.104 An
alternative approach might be to enact a broad reform measure to provide states
with waivers from federal regulatory requirements.105 Either move would make
it easier for future administrations to incorporate federalism concerns into
environmental policy.
Barring legislative reform, it should still be possible to encourage greater
concern for federalism in the implementation of environmental law, at least on
the margin. Federal environmental statutes impose far more responsibilities and
authorities to the EPA than Congress appropriates the funds to fulfill. This
inevitably means that administration officials have some latitude to set priorities
to bring agency actions more (or less) in line with federalism values, at least on
the margin. Such flexibility is undoubtedly constrained by the precise authorities
contained in statutes, and the inevitability of litigation seeking to force agency
action in one direction or another, but what flexibility there is can be used to
support or undermine more cooperative environmental federalism.
Specifically, an administration committed to federalism in environmental
policy would focus on addressing those environmental concerns that individual
states are unwilling or unable to address themselves, such as those involving
interstate spillovers, and finding ways to assist state-level implementation of
state-level environmental priorities. There is much an administration could do
to facilitate greater information sharing and dissemination of technical
knowledge about environmental problems and potential solutions, while
generally leaving states to make the front-line decisions about which particular
environmental concerns to prioritize. Barring extenuating circumstances, if state
policymakers and local communities do not believe a localized environmental
concern is its highest environmental priority, it is not clear why federal
policymakers should attempt to overrule that judgment. A truly cooperative
federalism involves working with states to help them achieve their policy goals,
not coercing or cajoling them to conform to federal priorities.
Efforts to reinvigorate environmental federalism could be aided if states
were more aggressive in pushing a principled cooperative federalism agenda.
State attorneys general sue the EPA all the time, but usually in defense of either
narrow parochial interests, or to score partisan political points. Red states sue
Democratic administrations and blue states sue Republican ones.

104. For a discussion of how and why to incentivize more frequent Congressional reauthorization of statutes,
see Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931 (2020).
105. One possibility is outlined in Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to
Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE
PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263 (Jim Chen ed., 2003).
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Litigation focused instead on expanding state prerogatives might do more
to give all states—red and blue—greater leeway to pursue their environmental
priorities. One such possibility might be a suit challenging the EPA’s ability to
threaten to withhold highway funds from states that fail to implement the CAA
according to federal dictates.106 Undoubtedly there could be others. Yet perhaps
such cases do not get filed for the same reasons the Trump Administration is
fair-weather in its federalist commitments. Perhaps there is no sustained
constituency for a principled environmental federalism. Or perhaps no
administration has yet tried to appeal to one.

106. See Adler & Stewart, supra note 35.
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